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Abstract: This article describes a computer program that will be used by experts to analyze human 
factor reliability when analyzing data obtained during the training of operators on 
a nuclear power plant's control room simulator. The program was applied to data collected 
during the training of a scenario called Rupture of the Hot Loop of the Primary Circuit 
(250 t/h). Based on the comparison of charts, temporal passage through the scenario, 
or by personal participation in the training, analysts evaluate the successful passing of 
the practice scenario and propose fi nal recommendations. The article also describes 
the criteria for successfully passing the practiced scenario and its fi nal evaluation.
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Introduction
One of the most important issues in the operation 
of nuclear power plants is safety. The Probabilistic 
Safety Assessment (PSA) is a systematic and 
comprehensive assessment of nuclear facilities. 
An important contributor to the overall risk of 
nuclear power plants is the human factor. To assess 
human impact on the safety of nuclear facilities, 
the Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is used within 
the PSA. The aim of the HRA analysis is to identify 
all possible human failures and determine their 
probability. Based on a detailed analysis, specialists 
determine the measures that lead to increased safety 
of the operation of nuclear power plants.
The content of this article is a description of 
the computer program and its use for the improvement 
of human factor reliability analysis within 
the probability assessment of nuclear power plant 
safety, for feedback in the training of the control 
room operators, and for the improvement of 
emergency operating procedures used by control 
room operators of the nuclear power plant.
There are currently a number of projects in 
the world that are focused on improving HRA 
methods and creating databases supporting HRA.
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is 
an intergovernmental agency that facilitates 
cooperation among countries with advanced nuclear 
technology infrastructures to seek excellence in 
nuclear safety, technology, science, environment, 
and law. The NEA, which is under the framework 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, is headquartered in Paris, France.
The NEA maintains seven specialised standing 
technical committees representing the major areas 
of the Agency's programme, each of which oversees 
various specialised working groups and task groups. 
These groups are comprised of member country 
experts who are both contributors to the programme 
of work and benefi ciaries of its results. For example: 
Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 
(CSNI), Committee on Nuclear Regulatory 
Activities (CNRA). (The Nuclear Energy Agency)
The International Atomic Energy Agency 
is the world's central intergovernmental forum 
for scientifi c and technical co-operation in 
the nuclear fi eld. It works for the safe, secure and 
peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, 
contributing to international peace and security and 
the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. 
(Overview)
The Scenario Authoring, Characterization, 
and Debriefi ng Application (SACADA) database 
was developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) for collecting operator 
performance data in simulator training for HRA. 
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While most of the technical underpinnings 
(e.g. guidelines and taxonomies) are developed by 
a bottom-up approach (i.e., the intensive review 
of existing literature), SACADA taxonomy is 
constructed on the basis of a cognitive model 
(i.e., a top-down approach). Certain human 
performance information that can be provided by 
SACADA data provided are diffi cult to be covered 
by the bottom-up approach. (Park et al., 2017)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed 
an approach for collecting human performance 
data from nuclear power plant (NPP) simulators. 
The information collected is constrained by 
the uniqueness of each particular plant and design 
of each particular simulator study. The process of 
simulator data collection can be described in four 
main phases: 
• preparation, 
• data collection, 
• data analysis, 
• reporting. (Hallbert et al., 2014) 
An important example of international 
cooperation for the safe and reliable operation of 
nuclear power plants is the OECD Halden Reactor 
Project. The Halden Reactor Project is performed and 
managed by the Institute for  Energy Technology in 
Norway and is the largest NEA joint project. Project 
is supported by more than 130 organisations in 
19 countries. The programme of work is in general 
split into two areas:
• The Fuel and Materials programme,
• The man, technology and organisation programme. 
(NEA Halden Reactor Project)
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(KAERI) is performed/ing a number of research 
activities to support an HRA. KAERI developed 
a standardized HRA method called K-HRA, for 
the PSAs of NPPs in Korea. A modifi ed K-HRA 
method, HuRECA (Human Reliability Evaluator 
for Control Actions), was developed to support 
the HRA for a new nuclear power plant that has 
fully digitalized human system interfaces in a main 
control room.
KAERI also has carried out research to collect 
data of human performance and reliability from 
simulators and event reports for HRA in Korea. 
KAERI’s research on HRA database can be divided 
into two phases:
• collecting and storing data in a OPERA (Operator 
erformance and Reliability Analysis) database,
• designing framework of data collection for 
HRA called HuREX (Human Reliability data 
Extraction).
Another major activity of KAERI is a pilot HRA 
study for advanced main control room with digital 
human system interfaces. (Jung et al., 2016)
The Czech Republic is represented in 
international projects mainly by ÚJV Řež, a.s. 
(Nuclear Research Institute) and the State Offi ce for 
Nuclear Safety.
ÚJV Řež, a.s., is a technical-engineering and 
research organization. ÚJV Řež focuses on research 
and development, design and engineering services, 
technical engineering, the manufacturing of special 
products and equipment, and expert activities in 
the fi elds of energy, industry and health. ÚJV Řež 
is intensively involved in international projects, 
e.g. within the The International Atomic Energy 
Agency and OECD/NEA, in projects supported by 
the European Commission. (Research and 
Development at ČEZ)
Materials and methods
Nuclear power plant Dukovany
Data collection for analysis was conducted 
during the training of operators of the control room 
of Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany (hereinafter 
Dukovany NPP) (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany
Periodic training on a full-scope simulator of 
the control room was attended by 31 operating crews in 
the simulator run relevant to the data collection project 
described in this article. To maintain anonymity, 
the crew identifi cation number is encrypted. 
All training participants have a valid license for 
the given function and mostly consist of the crew of one 
control room. Each practiced task is assigned a unique 
one-word code mark and an explanatory text 
description. (Kubíček and Dedera, 2011)
A full-scope control room replica-type simulator 
(see Fig. 2) developed by ORGREZ SC, a.s. Brno 
in co-operation with the American company GSE 
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Systems is used for the training of operators. 
(Technology and safety)
Fig. 2 Control room
Data collection
Data is recorded using a collection module in csv 
fi les and the separator is a semicolon, which makes 
it easy to open in Microsoft Excel.
Simulator data is recorded in two ways:
• periodically - the values are archived every second 
for the entire set of parameters (315 items),
• change - to record the status of actuators, signaling 
and interventions of the operator that do not 
change in the long-term. (Kubíček and Dedera, 
2011)
Data fi les
The time, identifi er of the archived variable, 
and its value at the given time are recorded in 
the data fi les. To ensure the comprehensibility of 
the record, it is supplemented with a textual 
description of the given variable, and for 
the discrete values of variables also with the meaning of 
the given value.
The computer program works with the data 
stored in the Periodic Parameter Listing. In 
this fi le, the selected quantities characterizing 
the status of the reactor are saved. The header contains 
the identifi er of the archived variable, the meaning 
of the value, and the physical unit. It is followed by 
a listing of the values of all the variables at a given 
time, as shown in Fig. 3. (Kubíček and Dedera, 2011)
Other examples of data fi les are:
• Task description fi le - contains a task code, 
an explanatory text description, encrypted crew 
identifi cation number.
• Operator intervention fi le - contains recorded 
manipulations of the control keys, switches and 
buttons in the control room, as well as commands 
entered via the touch screen of the turbine software 
control system.
• Change of actuator status fi le - contains moments 
of valve status changes (Closed-Opening-Paused-
Open-Closing), pumps and fans (On-Off).
• Instructor intervention fi le - records the instructor's 
actions affecting the course of the task (entering 
a state simulating the occurrence of a technological 
failure, executing the requested manipulation on 
components unavailable from the control room, 
etc.).
• Fault and technological signaling tableau status 
changes fi le.
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• P003a, E-0 step no. 20 - the possibility of reducing 
the number of operating high pressure emergency 
core cooling system (ECCS) pumps,
• E-0 step no. 29 - leaking P.C. - transition to E-1,
• E-1 step no. 10 - need to cool and depressurize 
the P.C. - transition to ES-1.2,
• ES-1.2 - cooling and depressurization of the P.C., 
gradual shutdown of high pressure ECCS pumps.
The task ends after cooling the P.C. below 
165 °C and the shutdown of the last high pressure 
ECCS pump. (Task bank)
Objectives of the training and success 
criteria
The main objective of the training is to enable 
the crew, in accordance with operating procedures, to:
• diagnose leakage from the primary circuit,
• evaluate its approximate size,
• identify the correct fault resolution procedure 
according to P003a,
• carry out the necessary manipulations on 
the technological equipment according to P003a,
• achieve safe reactor status according to P003a. 
(Task bank)
Achievement of the above training objectives 
and the success of individual control room operating 
crews can be assessed using predefi ned success 
criteria - in the case of this scenario, the following 
criteria need to be met:
• timely cooling (through the steam bypass station 
to condenser) and depressurization of the P.C. 
(by injection from the make-up system) according 
to the procedures E-0, E-1 and ES-1.2,
• restore the level in the pressurizer to 6.3 m before 
commencing the shutdown of the high-pressure 
pumps, 
• gradual shutdown of high pressure ECCS pumps 
(one or two),
• not to allow for a pressure drop in the P.C. 
< 8.3 MPa, until the temperature in the hot loops 
drops < 240 °C,
• when cooling the P.C, according to the foldout 
conditional information page (hereinafter foldout 
page), the operating crew must cool the feed water 
tanks (FWT) so that the feed water is 60-100 °C 
cooler than the water in the hot loops,
• keeping the pressure in the steam generator boxes 
as near as possible to atmospheric (overpressure 
< +10 kPa), when running the containment spray 
system pumps,
• Reactor control signaling system status changes 
fi le. (Kubíček and Dedera, 2011)
Description of the practiced scenario
To analyze training data on the control room 
simulator, the task " Rupture of the Hot Loop of 
the Primary Circuit (250 t/h)" was selected from the 
task bank. This task is included in thematic unit 3 
- abnormal and emergency scenarios. In particular, 
the use of operating procedure P003a - Emergency 
Operating Procedures (EOPs) is practiced here. 
The purpose of this procedure is to provide 
instructions for restoring a safe status of the unit 
by means of specifi c procedures in the event of any 
situation leading to the need for a quick shutdown 
of the reactor. These procedures cover a wide range 
of events, ranging from a simple shutdown of 
the reactor (by the reactor trip system (RTS)) 
through project emergencies to some beyond design 
basis accidents. This part of P003a prescribes to 
the operators the activity necessary to solve such 
transition processes during which the RTS system 
functions automatically or manually or activation 
of ESFAS (Engineered Safety Features Actuation 
Systems) occurs. (Task bank)
The general objectives of the training are to 
acquire or improve the ability of participants to 
organize and perform activities leading to the removal 
of an emergency state of the reactor, especially using 
operating procedure P003. Furthermore, to enhance 
the ability of participants to communicate correctly, 
use operational documentation correctly, and observe 
the operation and equipment control policies in 
Dukovany NPP in accordance with applicable work 
practices and methodology. (Task bank)
Basic description of the scenario
The control room crew will initiate the solving 
of the task according to operating procedure P003. 
The condition for entering the E-0 procedure is 
the automatic incorporation of RTS HO-1, that is, 
the manual shutdown of the reactor with the HO-1 
emergency response button.
The important points of the process of solving 
the task are (transitions between procedures, 
regulations, or important decision-making steps):
• Assessment of leakage from the Primary Circuit 
(P.C.) into the steam generator boxes and 
the incorporation of RTS (using the button) HO-1,
• Incorporation of ESFAS "Small leakage", 
"Moderate leakage" - activity of emergency 
systems,
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a list of items from which a user can select one or 
more. To select multiple items, you need to choose 
the MultiSelect property. The sub-program fi lls 
the ListBox with a list of the quantities characterizing 
the status of the nuclear power plant. (Král, 2010)
The sub-program for creating chart is available 
in two variants. The fi rst option allows the user to 
plot a chart for each selected item from the ListBox 
into a separate image. The second option draws all 
charts into the same image. When creating charts, 
we use the Char object. Charts can be placed on 
a separate worksheet with the chart or in the graphic 
layer in the worksheet. (Král, 2010)
The sub-program consists of the following steps:
• defi ning a data area for the chart (using 
the SetSourceData method),
• adding the chart (Add method) and determining 
the chart type,
• description of the chart and the axis (e.g. text, 
location).
For better clarity and fast comparison of charts, 
it is advisable to save the charts in the appropriate 
directories. To do so, use the sub-program for 
the export of charts.
If the already plotted charts are saved, or if 
the user opts for other charts, it is advisable to delete 
unnecessary charts. To do so, use the sub-program 
for deleting charts.
The sub-program for help viewing serves 
both to access the user manual and to display 
the label when move over the object with the mouse 
(the so-called tooltip).
The resulting chart for a randomly selected 
operating crew of the control room and a randomly 
selected quantity is shown in Fig. 4.
The user interface
Last but not least, it is necessary to design 
a suitable user interface (see Figure 5), which 
is used by the user to control the program. 
For this purpose, we will use the fi rst sheet of 
the workbook. This datasheet does not contain data, it 
is used to insert ActiveX control elements - ListBox, 
CommandButton, Image, Label. (Benáčanová, 
2012)
Discussion
The output of the created program is a set of 
charts that are used to monitor the development of 
a parameter characterizing the status of the reactor 
during a simulated event.
• not to exceed a cooling trend of 60 °C/h due to 
the risk of pressure thermal shock.
Results
Visual basic for application
The computer program was developed as 
an analytical tool that will be used in human 
reliability analysis for a faster and less 
time-consuming evaluation of a control room 
operating crews when going through the scenario.
As a suitable tool for creating a computer 
program designed to analyze collected data, 
the Visual Basic for Application programming 
language was chosen, specifi cally for Microsoft 
Excel. It is an object-oriented programming language 
that is part of MS Offi ce.
The VBA program works with Objects, their 
Properties, Methods, and Events. The properties 
can be pre-set in the properties window or modifi ed 
by the program. Methods are operations that can 
be performed with Objects (functions, commands). 
An Event can be triggered by a user, a program, 
or an action. (Benáčanová, 2012)
The entire program will be divided into 
the following functional units (sub-programs):
• a sub-program for opening a fi le and for loading 
data from a fi le to a worksheet,
• a sub-program for accessing the list of quantities 
characterizing the status of the reactor,
• a sub-program for creating chart,
• a sub-program for the export of charts to 
the directory,
• a sub-program for deleting charts,
• a sub-program for help viewing.
A brief description of the sub-programs
The sub-program for opening a fi le and 
for loading data from a fi le to a worksheet will 
display a dialog window where the user selects 
the fi le (or more fi les) to import. For this purpose 
we will use the FileDialog object. We save the name 
of the imported fi le in the appropriate variable. Use 
the Add method to add a new sheet to the workbook. 
The name of the worksheet will be the same as that 
of the crew for which the data was collected. We 
load the data from the fi le in this prepared sheet. 
(Král, 2010; Laurenčík, 2013)
The sub-program for accessing the list of 
quantities characterizing the status of the reactor 
uses the ListBox control element. ListBox is 
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• Flows of high pressure pumps, 
• Pressure in the steam generator boxes,
• Flows of containment spray system pumps,
• The temperature difference between the primary 
circuit and the FWT (according to the foldout page 
it should be 60-100 °C),
• Temperatures in FWT,
To evaluate the scenario Rupture of the Hot 
Loop of the Primary Circuit (250 t/h), the following 
parameters were selected:
• Temperature in the P.C. (cooling trend must be < 
60 °C/h),
• Pressure in the P.C. (must not drop below 8.3 MPa 
until the temperature of the P.C. < 240 °C),
• Level in the pressurizer (must be > 6.3 m before 
high pressure ECCS pumps shutdown),
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Scenario evaluation
Tab. 1 lists the times of key events and operations 
of the operating crew from the occurrence of 
the initiation event or other monitored parameters. 
• Levels in low pressure ECCS tanks (after dropping 
to 40 cm, according to the foldout page the operator 
must go to ES-1.3 and check the automatic switch 
to intake from the steam generator box).
DOI 10.1515/tvsbses-2017-0010 
Operating 
crew HO-1 
Opening of the 
steam dump 
valves to the 
main condensate 
Injection 
into the  
pressurizer  
Level in 
the  
pressurizer  
6,3m 
Shutdown 
1st high 
pressure 
pump 
Shutdown 
2nd  high 
pressure 
pump   
End of 
simulation 
Temp. 
difference 
P.C.-FWT 
302 b3KR 0:00:37 0:22:43 0:25:33 0:46:49 0:50:56 - 0:51:04 50-60 °C 
305 N2KR 0:01:03 0:23:09 0:26:02 0:53:56 0:48:14 0:57:39 1:26:56 40-50 °C 
307 O2KR 0:01:22 0:28:11 - - - - 0:32:36 ok 
309 P2KR 0:01:23 0:13:55 0:19:35 0:32:45 0:32:50 0:34:35 0:38:25 40-50 °C 
311 J2KR 0:00:48 0:24:24 0:14:31 0:38:34 0:41:44 0:45:47 0:52:35 ok 
313 K2KR 0:01:05 0:27:58 0:32:38 - - - 0:34:38 ok 
315 crKR 0:01:21 0:26:25 0:17:17 - 0:37:41 - 0:42:35 ok 
317 drKR 0:00:45 0:18:56 0:22:01 0:42:07 0:43:25 0:45:53 0:50:55 ok 
321 ZrKR 0:01:00 0:20:08 0:26:05 0:48:05 0:49:34 0:51:22 1:03:38 40-50 °C 
326 VrKR 0:00:56 0:39:35 0:19:17 0:46:42 0:53:26 0:59:50 1:18:23 50-60 °C 
328 e_aR 0:00:41 0:25:16 0:14:28 0:49:57 0:50:57 0:54:54 1:04:45 40-50 °C 
329 brKR 0:00:57 0:24:40 0:28:31 0:48:44 0:51:38 0:54:05 0:55:44 ok 
332 IqKR 0:00:41 0:17:42 0:21:50 0:37:15 0:39:32 0:41:13 0:45:47 ok 
334 dvKR 0:00:27 0:19:14 0:22:06 0:39:57 0:41:49 0:44:04 1:01:12 ok 
336 evKR 0:01:27 0:17:16 0:21:26 0:39:10 0:41:57 0:43:32 0:47:12 40-50 °C 
338 fvKR 0:01:22 0:24:17 0:29:14 0:45:18 0:46:49 0:48:37 1:08:18 30-40 °C 
340 ZvKR 0:01:02 0:20:05 0:24:06 0:41:10 0:43:21 0:45:36 0:53:14 ok 
342 bvKR 0:01:09 0:23:46 0:15:52 - 0:43:40 - 0:49:01 50-60 °C 
344 UvKR 0:01:21 0:22:33 0:24:40 0:44:18 0:45:20 0:50:11 0:55:39 40-50 °C 
346 VvKR 0:00:53 0:21:15 0:27:46 0:45:07 0:47:11 0:49:31 0:59:31 40-50 °C 
348 PuKR 0:00:45 0:24:34 0:29:58 0:48:22 - - 0:49:38 50-60 °C 
350 IuKR 0:00:38 0:22:59 0:29:55 0:46:50 0:47:11 0:50:10 0:53:29 ok 
353 KuKR 0:00:45 0:18:17 0:20:58 0:40:37 0:42:49 0:43:43 0:47:48 >100 °C 
355 ejKR 0:00:44 0:18:19 0:19:17 0:41:00 0:41:37 0:43:09 0:57:36 50-60 °C 
357 fjKR 0:00:50 0:26:02 0:33:18 0:51:16 0:53:48 0:54:24 0:54:54 40-50 °C 
360 ABVQ 0:00:41 0:15:21 0:18:45 0:41:51 0:43:27 0:44:29 0:47:42 ok 
361 UjKR 0:01:22 0:27:47 0:35:13 0:57:04 0:58:28 1:03:04 1:09:28 ok 
363 UjKR1 0:00:47 0:17:03 0:21:54 0:39:15 0:41:23 0:44:00 0:52:19 ok 
365 VjKR 0:01:07 0:20:56 0:15:28 0:41:01 0:42:26 0:45:35 0:50:03 ok 
367 OiKR 0:00:51 0:23:14 0:30:39 0:46:22 0:51:00 - 0:51:44 ok 
368 NiKR 0:00:58 0:34:49 0:43:10 0:56:46 1:01:42 1:03:42 1:05:42 ok 
Average 0:00:58 0:22:56 0:24:23 0:44:50 0:46:13 0:49:08 0:54:36 - 
Tab. 1 Times of key operations of the control room operating crews
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240 °C. The reason for this warning is to prevent 
the initiation of the ESFAS "Large Leak" signal. Of 
the 31 observed operating crews, all fulfulled this 
condition (except for operating crews 307 and 313, 
in the case of whom the simulation was terminated 
prematurely).
Level increase in the pressurizer to 6.3 m
• A necessary condition for initiating the shutdown 
of the high pressure ECCS pumps is an increase 
of the level in the pressurizer to 6.3 m, since 
the pressurizer level may decrease sharply after 
the high pressure ECCS pump is shut down. This 
condition was not met by a total of 3 operating 
crews - 305, 315, 342 (we do not consider 
operating 307, 313, where the simulation was 
prematurely terminated), see the fi fth column of 
Tab. 1 (highlighted in red). For example, in Figure 
6 we can see that, in the case of operating crew 315, 
at the moment of the high pressure ECCS pump 
shutdown at 0:37:41 the pressurizer level was 
only 1.7 m and in Fig. 7 in the case of operating 
crew 342, the level at the moment of shutdown 
of the high pressure ECCS pump (0:43:40) in 
the pressurizer was 4,5 m.
Fig. 6 Total level in the pressurizer of operating 
crew 315
Fig. 7 Total level in the pressurizer of operating 
crew 342
Tasks prematurely terminated by the instructor 
for time reasons are indicated by a gray fi eld in 
the table. The fi rst column lists all 31 operating crews 
by their assigned codes to ensure the anonymity of 
individual operating crews.
Impact of HO-1
In the second column of Tab. 1, the emergercy 
response impact time (HO-1) is plotted after 
the occurrence of the initiation event. Six cases in 
which HO-1 was impacted automatically (always 
at approximately 1:22) are highlighted in yellow. 
In other cases, the HO-1 was initiated manually by 
the control room operating crew. From these times, 
it is clear that most operators were able to correctly 
evaluate the symptoms of a given IE in an extremely 
short time.
Initiation of cooling of the P.C. with 
the steam dump valves to the main 
condensate 
The third column of Tab. 1 shows the start time 
of cooling initiation of the P.C. (or initiation of 
the preparation of cooling) by means of the steam 
dump valves to the main condensate according to 
step 6 of ES-1.2. This cooling should be performed at 
a recommended trend of < 60 °C per hour. This point 
was handled by all operating crews successfully - 
the average steam dump valves to the main 
condensate cooling initiation time was 0:22:56.
Initiation of the P.C. depressurization 
by injection into the pressurizer
The initiation time of P.C. depressurization 
by means of injection into the pressurizer from 
the make-up system by opening the 2YP10S28 
electro-armature according to step 10 in ES-1.2 is 
monitored in the fourth column of Tab. 1. In six 
cases (highlighted in yellow), the operator began 
to prepare the depressurisation slightly earlier 
according to procedure E-1, step 5.
Depressurization of the P.C. was not initiated 
only by operating crew 307 for reasons of premature 
termination of the task (highlighted in gray). With 
the exception of the above-mentioned operating 
crew 307, all operating crews successfully initiated 
depressurization at an average time of 0:24:23.
When cooling and depressurizing the P.C., 
the operating crews must meet the criterion set 
out in warning II in step 10 of ES-1.2: Do not 
allow a pressure drop of the P.C. < 8,3 MPa until 
the temperature in the hot loops has dropped < 
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so the difference between the temperature of the P.C. 
hot loop and FWT was less than 60 °C. For example, 
in the case of operator 338, the difference between 
the temperature of the P.C. hot loop and FWT was 
about 37 °C (see Fig. 8). The temperature fl ow in the 
feed water tanks for operator 338 is shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 Temperatures in the feed water tanks of 
operating crew 338
A total of 16 control room operators maintained 
the prescribed temperature difference, while 
the remaining 6 operators deviated from observing 
this parameter only slightly, or they began cooling 
a little later.
Cooling the P.C. with a trend of max. 
60 °C/h
Cooling of P.C. with a trend of max. 60 °C/h 
is prescribed in step 6 of ES-1.2. This emergency 
cooling trend of 60 °C/h was tested by a strength 
calculation and it was verifi ed to cause neither 
damage to the reactor pressure vessel nor shorten its 
service life.
To determine this parameter, the following P.C. 
limit temperatures were used:
1. temperature of the cold loops of the P.C. when 
SVD-MC cooling is initiated,
2. temperature of the cold loops of the P.C. at the end 
of the simulation.
The difference in these temperatures was divided 
by the difference in time.
However, the 60 °C/h trend does not mean an 
"instantaneous" cooling rate, but rather a cooling 
rate over the last 60 minutes. The cooling time was 
shorter than the required 60 minutes in almost all 
cases (except operator 305).
At the beginning of the cooling, the trend of 
60 °C/h was exceeded by a total of 11 operators, 
but it is highly probable that during the scenario, 
the cooling rate would be reduced, as the operators 
have information regarding the cooling trend directly 
available to them.
Gradual shutdown of high pressure ECCS 
pumps
The main objective of ES-1.2 is the gradual 
shutdown of high pressure pumps according 
to step 14 in ES-1.2 - this is the main step of 
the whole process. The purpose of this step is to reduce 
the high pressure ECCS pumps fl ow rate by lowering 
the pressure in the P.C. and hence the total leakage 
from the damaged P.C. This step was successfully 
achieved by all observed operating crews (except 
for 307, 313, 348, for whom the simulation was 
terminated prematurely - highlighted in gray), see 
the sixth and seventh columns of Tab. 1. The average 
shutdown time of the fi rst high pressure ECCS 
pump was 0:46:13. The average shutdown time of 
the second high pressure ECCS pump was 0:49:08. 
The second high pressure ECCS pump was not shut 
down by another 4 operating crews (302, 315, 342, 
367) because the simulation was terminated when 
the fi rst high pressure ECCS pump was successfully 
shut down.
Cooling of the feed water tanks
For an optimal solution to the emergency 
scenario, the operating crew should adhere to 
a number of prescribed procedures. One of them is 
a condition on the foldout conditional information 
page related to the cooling of the feed water tanks 
(FWT) so that the feed water is 60-100 °C cooler 
than the water in the hot loops.
Only operating crew 353 cooled the FWT 
too fast, so the FWT temperature difference and 
the mean temperature of the P.C. loops was slightly 
above 100 °C.
Fig. 8 Temperature difference between the P.C. and 
feed water tanks of operating crew 338
On the other hand, eight operating crews - 305, 
328, 336, 338, 342, 344, 348, 357 - did not begin 
to cool the FWT before the scenario was terminated 
(highlighted in orange in the last column in Tab. 1), 
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4. perform the necessary manipulations on 
technological equipment according to the P003a,
5. achieve a safe reactor status according to P003a.
In general, the operators worked correctly with 
the procedures, according to the instructions they 
gradually cooled the P.C. and shut down the high 
pressure ECCS pumps. However, more detailed 
analysis has identifi ed some minor defi ciencies 
that are described in the previous section. Typical 
operator errors identifi ed in this scenario were:
• not restoring the pressurizer level to 6.3 m before 
switching off the high pressure ECCS pumps 
(3 crews),
• FWT cooling outside of the recommended 
difference from the P.C. (60-100 °C),
• increase of overpressure in the steam generator 
boxes above +10 kPa by insuffi cient cooling of 
the containment spray exchanger from 
the essentials service water side.
Based on these shortcomings, the following 
recommendations were formulated:
Recommendations for training
• Place emphasis on keeping track of the foldout 
conditional information page. Observations 
from previous data collections have confi rmed 
that operators do not always consistently follow 
the foldout page. Specifi cally, the lack of cooling 
of the FWT during the cooling of the P.C was 
observed in several operators, so the temperature 
difference between the FWT and the P.C. was 
outside the recommended range of 60-100 °C.
• Due to the short scenario times, it was not possible 
to verify the hypothesis that some operators 
exceeded the maximum permitted cooling trend of 
60 °C/h, as cooling through the steam dump valves 
to the main condensate took an average of only 
31 minutes before the scenarios were terminated. 
It will be possible to test this hypothesis during an 
analysis of other scenarios in future. In general, 
it might be advisable to place more emphasis 
on adhering to the recommended trends, thus 
avoiding a potential threat of reactor vessel rupture 
as a result of pressure thermal shock.
Recommendations for procedures
• Add to procedure ES-1.2 of the foldout page 
(or to the backup only), point "Spray pump 
fl ow" the note "Maintain the fl ow of at least one 
containment spray pump...including suffi cient 
cooling of the containment spray pumps exchanger 
from the essentials service water". This will also 
Maintaining pressure in the steam 
generator box
According to ES-1.2, step 3, the operator must 
maintain pressure in the steam generator box as 
close as possible to atmospheric when running 
the containment spray pumps to minimize any 
leakage. According to the foldout page, the operator 
has to ensure the operation of at least 1 containment 
spray pump when the box pressure increases to 
+8 kPa. In addition to minimizing possible leakage 
to the environment, it is intended to prevent 
the recurring signal "Overpressure in the box 
+10 kPa".
The requirement for the running of the spray 
pumps was fulfi lled by all operators (i.e. all 
3 containment spray pumps were turned on at 
the beginning of the scenario and then gradually 
shut down). In two cases (operators 357, 368), 
however, despite 3 running containment spray 
pumps, overpressure in the steam generator box 
increased above +10 kPa and there was an impact of 
the ESFAS signal (which in practice meant only 
the lighting of the relevant indicators, since 
the relevant emergency system was already in 
operation). The increase in pressure despite 
the running containment spray pumps was due to 
insuffi cient (in the case of operator 357) or no (in 
the case of operator 368) cooling of the containment 
spray exchanger from the essentials service water 
side.
Conclusions and recommendations
A detailed analysis of available data and 
consultation with training instructors on 
the full-scope control room simulator show that 
the control room operating crews who participated 
in the training of this task successfully met the main 
training objectives:
1. diagnose leakage from the P.C.,
2. evaluate its approximate size,
3. determine the correct procedure for addressing 
the fault according to P003a, i.e. go through 
the procedures:
• Entry into E-0 "RTS or ESFAS",
• E-0, step 29 leaking P.C. - transition to E-1 
"Loss of Primary Coolant",
• E-1, step 10 the need to cool and depressurize 
the P.C - transition to ES-1.2 "Cooling of 
the P.C. after LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident)",
• ES-1.2 cooling and depressurization of e P.C., 
gradual shutdown of high pressure ECCS 
pumps,
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• Add the following parameters in the list of 
the collected data:
o Trend of cooling of the P.C, (cold loops, e.g. in 
ES-1.2, k6):
- 5 min,
- 30 min,
- 60 min
o Flows through the steam dump valves to 
the main condensate,
o Flows through the steam dump valves to 
the atmosphere,
o Water/steam temperature in the steam generator 
1-6,
o Steam temperature in the main steam collector,
o Pressure in the main feeding collector,
o Degree of opening of the pressurizer relief 
valve, pressurizer safety valve directly in 
the parameter list,
• Combine collected data with records of observing 
operators either by an external entity or directly 
with records from instructors.
Conclusion
The computer program was created on the basis 
of an analyst request from the Nuclear Research 
Institute Řež, a.s. as a new analytical tool designed 
to automate the evaluation of a large amount of data 
collected during the training of operating crews at 
a nuclear power plant control room simulator. During 
the creation of the program, data from the training 
task Rupture of the Hot Loop of the Primary Circuit 
(250 t/h) were used. Based on the comparison of 
charts, temporal passage through the scenario, or 
by personal participation in the training, analysts 
evaluate the successful passing of the practice 
scenario and propose fi nal recommendations.
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most likely also be covered in the foldout page of 
other procedures.
• Add to the backup ES-1.2, step 3, Key operations: 
Checking the operation of the spray pumps and 
cooling of the containment spray pumps exchanger 
from the essentials service water.
• In the case of insuffi cient cooling of the FWT, 
the fact that the instruction is the last one on 
the foldout page may have had an infl uence. It 
could help to divide the instructions into two parts 
- one for the primary circuit operator, the second 
for the secondary circuit operator, so that each one 
of them only has to keep track of their own limited 
number of parameters.
• In the ES-1.2 code backup, in step 6, add to 
the information about the maximum cooling rate 
of 60 °C/h that it is the last hour trend, not an 
instantaneous cooling rate.
Recommendations for PSA and HRA
• Using the Bayesian approach, the probability of 
failure of the control room operator when cooling 
and depressurizing the P.C. after a medium 
LOCA initiating event will be altered - improved 
quantifi cation is expected.
• Using the Bayesian approach, modify 
the probability of failure of the control room 
operators when reloading the intake from the low 
pressure ECCS reservoirs to intake from the steam 
generator boxes.
• Some errors were identifi ed in the operator actions 
records related to so called „group controls“. 
Thus, in the quantifi cation of operator failure, it 
is always necessary to take into account whether 
a component controlled by a dedicated control or 
a group control.
• Similarly, when quantifying probability of operator 
error, it is always necessary to take into account 
whether it is an instruction given directly in 
the body of the procedure or "only" on the foldout 
conditional information page (higher probability 
of failure).
Recommendations for subsequent data 
collection
• Add information about any simulation failure. 
Information might have to be entered manually by 
the instructor.
• In the case of the parameters Total level in 
the steam generator and Medium level in the steam 
generator, the units in the data outputs have most 
likely been switched (cm vs. m).
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